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Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of others on the Federal Open Market Committee.A weaker-than-expected recovery
The U.S. economy is growing only sluggishly, and the 
FOMC has warned about “substantial downside risks.”
Should economic performance deteriorate, monetary policy 
will respond.
The Fed has potent tools at its disposal and is not now, or 
ever, “out of ammunition.”
The main question remains how to conduct an effective, 
systematic, countercyclical monetary policy when nominal 
interest rates are near zero.
I will offer some suggestions for monetary policy going 
forward.Three guidelines for medium-term monetary policy
Embrace rule-like behavior.
Transmit policy through inflation and expected inflation, as 
opposed to nominal interest rates.
Keep a keen awareness of the Japanese example.
 Relying solely on promises of low policy rates for longer and 
longer periods of time may simply be a path to the Japanese 
outcome.Sluggish Economic GrowthAmerica’s investment problem
The pace of economic recovery during 2011 has been 
disappointing.
Most components of real GDP have recovered to or beyond 
their 2007 Q4 peak.
Aggregate real household consumption, for instance, is 
higher today than at any time in U.S. postwar history.
However, investment is still off the 2007 Q4 peak by about 
16 percent.
Much of this is due to weakness in residential investment and 
investment in nonresidential structures.Real consumption: recovered
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: 2011-Q2.Real investment: still down 16 percent
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: 2011-Q2.Real investment in nonresidential structures
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: 2011-Q2.Real residential investment
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: 2011-Q2.A bubble has collapsed
This looks like a collapsed real estate bubble.
If the investment component of GDP had recovered to the 
extent that consumption has recovered, GDP would be higher 
by 4.2%.*
But it is not reasonable to think that these particular areas of 
investment should robustly expand in the aftermath of a 
collapsed real estate bubble.
* Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s calculations.Sluggish growth
Sluggish growth leaves the U.S. economy vulnerable to 
further negative shocks.
My expectation is still for modest and improving economic 
growth over the next year.
However, should further weakness develop, monetary policy 
will need to respond appropriately.The FOMC at another crossroads
How should the Committee proceed in this circumstance, 
should further monetary policy action be warranted?
The Fed is not now, or ever, “out of ammunition.”
Still, the Fed cannot operate through its preferred channel, 
which is short-term nominal interest rates.
I will now turn to discuss some guidelines concerning 
monetary policy in a continuing era of near-zero interest 
rates. Embrace Rule-Like Behavior Recent one-time policy actions
Most monetary policy actions since the zero bound was 
encountered have been characterized by one-time policy 
announcements coupled with fixed end dates.
This has been at odds with notions of optimal monetary 
policy developed over the last several decades.
Most of the economic literature in the last 30 years has 
emphasized that a policy is not a one-time action but a rule 
mapping economic circumstances into changes in the policy 
instrument both today and in the future.Past Committee behavior
The Committee in the past did not contemplate announcing 
several hundred basis point interest rate moves with a fixed 
end date.  Yet that is how the Committee behaves today.
Instead the Committee announced a certain interest rate 
adjustment along with a continuation value, or bias, 
concerning future announcements.
This approach served the Committee well for decades.
Later research suggested that this type of policy approach 
was very close to the optimal policy arrangement.Policy rules
Today, attempts to influence nominal interest rates are 
increasingly irrelevant as the entire Treasury term structure is 
very low.
Attempts to influence other, non-Treasury nominal interest 
rates directly would interfere with the risk premia attached to 
those yields.
But the Committee can still control inflation through an 
appropriate balance sheet policy.
The principle of adjusting policy meeting-by-meeting in 
reaction to economic events, along with a bias, applies to 
balance sheet policy as it did during interest rate targeting.Rules versus discretion
A meeting-by-meeting balance sheet policy constitutes a 
rules-based policy because the Committee would make 
adjustments in response to economic events, just as in the 
interest rate targeting world.
In contrast, the policy approach of the last several years, with 
announcements of large dollar amounts, fixed end dates, and 
rapidly changing tactics, seems fairly discretionary.
Returning to a more rules-based approach may provide 
needed stability to the U.S. macroeconomy. Transmission Transmission
How can monetary policy be conducted when nominal 
interest rates are so close to zero?
I believe it is important to think in terms of inflation and 
expected inflation.
With the policy rate at zero, higher expected inflation lowers 
real interest rates.
This is stimulative monetary policy by conventional 
definitions.Influencing expected inflation
Outright purchases of government debt by the monetary 
authority are considered inflationary, and rightly so.
There is ample international evidence over decades and 
centuries that too much of this activity is associated with 
increases in inflation.
This channel can be used to help keep inflation near target 
during the current unusual circumstance, and to help provide 
some support to the nation’s economic recovery.A potent tool
Outright asset purchases are a potent tool and must be 
employed carefully.
For a review of the evidence on QE2, see my discussion “The 
Effectiveness of QE2.” *
Inflation and inflation expectations rose during the last year, 
even though many measures of economic performance 
indicate that the economy was relatively weak.
The meeting-by-meeting approach would allow the 
Committee to carefully monitor and adjust any program.
* Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Regional Economist, July 2011, p. 3.Inflation turns around
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s calculations. Last observations: July 2011 and 2011-Q2.Some Alternatives An alternative approach: the communications tool
An alternative would be for the Committee to use the 
promised date of the first interest rate increase as the primary 
policy tool during the upcoming period of continuing near-
zero policy rates.
By shifting this date, the Committee, at least according to 
some models, can influence financial market conditions and 
provide monetary accommodation if it so desires.
This is the so-called communications tool.
The communications tool works inside models but has some 
important caveats for actual policy application.The communications tool: credible promises?
One is that it is not clear how credible actual announcements 
can be.  
If the economy is actually performing quite well at the point 
in the future where the promise begins to bite, then the 
Committee may simply abandon the promise and return to 
normal policy.
But this behavior, if understood by markets, would cancel out 
the initial effects of the promise, and so nothing would be 
accomplished by making the initial promise.
A non-credible announcement would simply fall flat.The communications tool: path to Japan?
There is another drawback to the communications tool.
Simply promising to keep the policy rate near-zero for longer 
and longer periods of time may encourage a Japanese-style 
outcome in which the policy rate simply remains near zero and 
markets come to expect a mild rate of deflation.
This possibility has clear support in the theoretical literature 
and in the Japanese data but is too often ignored in policy 
discussions.
See the discussion in my paper, “Seven Faces of ‘The Peril’.” *
*  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2010, 92(5), pp. 339-52.The communications tool: ties to actual outcomes?
The Committee could also tie a promise of near-zero policy 
rates to actual outcomes in the economy, such as the 
unemployment rate.
Unfortunately, unemployment rates have a checkered history 
in advanced economies over the last several decades.
In particular, “hysteresis” has been a common problem, in 
which unemployment rises and simply stays high.
This occurred in Europe during the last 30 years.
If such an outcome happened in the U.S., and monetary 
policy was explicitly tied to unemployment outcomes, 
monetary policy could be pulled off course for a generation.European unemployment: hysteresis
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators . Last observations: 2011-Q1 (Germany, Italy) and 2011-Q2 (France).ConclusionsConclusions
U.S. monetary policy is again at a crossroads.
Going forward, policy should strive to be more rules-based 
and less discretionary than it has been in the last three years.
Monetary policy transmission can occur through expected 
inflation.
 With nominal rates at zero, higher expected inflation lowers 
real interest rates.
 The Committee still has to judge tradeoffs between inflation 
and support for the recovery.
A communications policy which stresses longer and longer 
periods of near-zero policy rates may be counterproductive. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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